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Acts of Defacement, Memory  
of Loss 
Ghostly Effects of the “Armenian Crisis”  
in Mardin, Southeastern Turkey
Zerrin ÖZlem Biner
The article explores the multiple articulations of the 1915 deportations and mas-
sacres, predominantly of Armenians but also of Syriac Christians, in the Ottoman 
Empire and the ways in which the descendants of the victims, the perpetrators 
and the witnesses experience and narrate the historical and political effects of 
those events. Stories about Christian converts to Islam and houses abandoned by 
the victims become subjects/objects of ethnographic inquiry which are analyzed 
to reveal the discourses and imagination surrounding the taboo-like secrecy of 
the events and the hidden bonds between the subjects, who belong to different 
ethnic and religious communities in the cosmopolitan border city of Mardin in 
southeastern Turkey. 
In his analysis of the historiography of the Armenian deportations and 
massacres of 1915, Selim Deringil compares delving into the “Armenian 
crisis” to venturing into a minefield, fraught as it is with the risk of being 
stigmatized either for having betrayed one’s country or for having denied 
the historical fact known as the “Armenian genocide.”1 As a “critical 
event” the 1915 events have continued to mark the history of Turkey—in 
families, communities, parliaments, states, supra-national organizations 
and international courts.2 The nature of the debate was long confined to 
two opposing arguments, namely the Turkish thesis and the Armenian 
thesis —the former defining the events as tehcir (relocation), a legitimate 
act of war intended to protect Turkish sovereignty from the Armenian 
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gangs who had betrayed the Turks by collaborating with the Russians, and 
the latter defining the events as the Ottoman Empire’s “genocide/ethnic 
cleansing” of the Armenians during World War I. According to the Turk-
ish thesis, tehcir was a defensive action that resulted in the deaths of both 
Armenians and Turks during wartime but did not plan to systematically 
kill or eradicate the Armenians.3 
During Turkey’s membership talks with the European Union (EU), 
which began in October 2005, the Armenian issue was reframed under 
the rubric of “human rights,” with special reference to minority rights. 
International actors insisted that Turkey’s acknowledgment of the true 
nature of those events was required in order to certify the democratization 
of Turkey prior to its entry into the EU. Faced with political pressure on 
the international stage, Turkish bureaucrats decided to change state strat-
egy and sought to base their denials of genocide on historical evidence, 
thus allowing for a wider discussion that would include material from the 
Ottoman archives. To this end, a series of archival works were published 
by official institutions such as the Turkish Historical Society (Türk Tarih 
Kurumu), which maintained that there was no credible documentation 
of an official decision taken by the Ottoman state to kill Armenians. In 
response to these claims, Armenian scholars accused Turkish authorities 
of blocking access to specific documents, thereby avoiding complete 
disclosure of the historical facts.4 The issue’s growing notoriety led to 
myriad arguments about the events of 1915 in the public sphere, which 
were expressed in such questions as “Who killed whom?” “How many 
people were killed?” and “Who were the real betrayers?”5
Notwithstanding the battle over the multiple interpretations of the 
events of 1915, “genocide” remained the meta-narrative dominating the 
signification of events in contemporary Turkey, on the one hand under-
pinning legal decisions, and on the other perpetuating anger and fear on 
the part of descendants of the victim populations, and the sense that their 
suffering had been forgotten. State officials have maintained the taboo-
like version of the events, thereby reinforcing the proscription of any 
attempt to define them as “genocide.” Many intellectuals, journalists and 
political activists have been prosecuted for criticizing the official discourse, 
particularly for speaking about genocide, under Article 301 of the Turk-
ish Criminal Code, which makes it illegal to insult Turkey, the Turkish 
ethnicity or Turkish government institutions. In 2007, in the ruling on 
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two Armenian journalists accused of having used the term “genocide,” the 
court’s decision was based “on the necessity to protect national security, 
public order and public security” and read: “Talk about genocide, both 
in Turkey and in other countries, unfavorably affects national security and 
the national interest.... The acceptance of this claim may lead in future 
centuries to a questioning of the sovereignty of rights of the Republic of 
Turkey over the lands on which it is claimed these events occurred.”6 In 
2009, these national-security-based concerns were also cited in documents 
produced by the ultra-nationalist terror organization Ergenekon (most 
of whose members have ties to military and security forces) as legitimate 
reasons to target for assassination those people known to have made 
claims of genocide.7 
These sanctions regarding discussion of the 1915 events were not 
only approved by courts of law and ultra-nationalist extremists. More 
significantly, they have affected public discourse and imagination about 
“outsiders” and “traitors.” The “Armenian genocide” has gradually 
become an indexical event, referred to by citizens of various ethnic, social 
and religious backgrounds in order to express their positions concerning 
the discourse and practices of the Turkish state.8 This has led to a dis-
turbing increase in protests and verbal attacks by people who claim to be 
members of civil society organizations and who make use of their affilia-
tions to stridently criticize prominent individuals they claim oppose official 
Turkish discourse. At the same time, it has also led to the production and 
circulation of alternative discussions and initiatives criticizing the denial-
ist perspective, recognizing the Armenians’ loss and attempting to create 
spaces for voicing and sharing the agony of, as well as the responsibility 
for, the events. The online campaign launched by intellectuals, activists 
and journalists in December 2008 that invited people to acknowledge 
the atrocities of the 1915 Armenian massacres and to apologize to the 
Armenian community was crucial for initiating a serious public debate 
concerning the confrontation with the past atrocities in Turkey.9 
This article does not aim to contribute to the current hegemonic 
battle over recognition or negation of the definition of the events of 1915 
as “genocide” or to pave the way to reconciliation between the victims, 
witnesses and perpetrators. Nor does it attempt to provide supporting 
evidence for the historians’ debates on the interpretation of the factuality 
of the events. Rather, I seek to question the totalizing, colonizing and 
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distancing aspects of the hegemonic discourses surrounding the discus-
sion of the events of the 1915 and thereby to take the interpretation of a 
catastrophic event beyond the confinements of the logic of proof, docu-
ment and archive.10 
Drawing on the intertwined and contradictory narratives of Syriac 
Christians, Arabs and Kurds— the descendants of victims, witnesses and 
perpetrators—the article invites the reader to look into a gray area where 
the boundaries of polarized, hegemonic discourses become blurred 
through forms of expression used to narrate the traces of the event itself. 
It invites the reader to reflect on the notion of “truth” in a cosmopolitan 
border city that bore witness to the catastrophic events in the nation-
building process of Turkey.11 
The bulk of the material in this article is drawn from fieldwork I 
conducted in Mardin and its surrounding villages and towns in southeast-
ern Turkey. Located close to the Syrian border, Mardin was literally and 
figuratively situated at the margins of contemporary Turkey. Here, the 
margin does not refer merely to a geographical location. In this context, 
it also denotes a borderline position with spaces of fluctuation between 
normality and emergency, continuity and discontinuity, order and disorder, 
legality and illegality.12 Mardin, as a margin, is a murky sphere endowed 
with residues of critical events, such as the events of 1915, early Kurdish 
uprisings, blood feuds, and the more recent military conflict between 
the Kurdistan Workers Party (Partiya Karkarên Kurdistan, PKK) and the 
Turkish army.13
During my ethnographic field trips to Mardin between 2001 and 
2009, in which I focused on the process of transition from emergency 
to normality during lulls in the conflict between the PKK and the Turk-
ish armed forces, I often found everyday conversations to be fraught 
with accounts of the events of 1915 and the “Kurdish problem” (Kürt 
sorunu).14 People refer to both events in order to reflect on the experi-
ence of suffering and marginality and to establish the causes and effects of 
violence. This does not mean that local references to the 1915 events in 
Mardin are not affected by the official taboo against claims of “genocide.” 
In the political contingency of a city under martial law, the inhabitants are 
very sensitive to the official discourse of Turkish nationalism and its legal 
and moral sanctions.15 Their talk consists of repetitive, fragmented narra-
tives that alternate between violent acts of the past and survival strategies 
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of the present. Yet, they resist being recorded in the form of a document.16 
Unlike the oral history narratives, autobiographies and memoirs that have 
recently proliferated in Turkey, the narratives of this ethnography do not 
function as expressions of religious or ethnic minority identities regarding 
their responses to repressive state practices and discourses.17 They function 
neither as testimonies to the truth of the event nor as reflections of the 
nostalgia for the cosmopolitan past of the city or the desire for reconcilia-
tion with the victims. Rather, they comprise fragmented forms of implicit 
knowledge that describe the ways in which the experience and imagina-
tion of a taboo-like event are brought into everyday life through daily 
encounters and practices in a cosmopolitan, militarized border city that 
is devoid of the discourse and practice of public mourning for the losses. 
In other words, the main aim of this article is to reach beyond the 
hegemonic representations by state officials, historians, legal experts and 
political actors, and to explore the idioms, tropes and signs that have 
been developed in response to violence and trauma. How can such a 
tabooed event be articulated when social biographies are contaminated 
by the destructive effects of violence? How does the memory of such a 
“critical event” affect the gaze of the self on the other in present-day 
Mardin, scarred as it is by the experience and imagination of the 1915 
events? How is it incorporated into the structure of everyday relations of 
Mardin’s inhabitants? What bonds exist between the families of perpetra-
tors, victims and witnesses? 
I first discuss the fragmented narratives of Kurds, Arabs and Syriac 
Christians that reveal modes of collectively remembering and forgetting 
the 1915 events in Mardin. I then show, on the one hand, the hidden 
connections between the hegemonic discourses and the local narratives 
about the events, and on the other, the presence of other bodies and spaces 
that permeate daily life in the form of residual appearances of the events. 
TRUTH METAMORPHOSED 
The truth about the Armenian genocide is simply not discussed by Mar-
dinites, who regard it as the common fate that haunts them all. Linking 
Turkey’s northern provinces with cities in Syria, the city of Mardin wit-
nessed the deportation and extermination of the Christian, predominantly 
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Armenian, population in 1915. Most of the Armenians vanished from the 
cityscape while those who remained clung to life by converting to Islam 
or feigning to be members of the Syriac Christian community. Some of 
the women and children were abducted by villagers and sold to prominent 
local Muslim families. Most of the property belonging to Armenians and 
Syriac Christians, including houses and churches, was either appropriated 
by the state and turned into military posts, hospitals, schools and prisons 
or distributed to Muslim migrants who had been expelled from their 
hometowns during the Balkan Wars. Property was also sold to local lead-
ing families. This was justified under the law of Emval-i Metruke (literally 
“abandoned properties”), which legalized the appropriation of Armenian 
and Syriac Christian property if the owner did not return within a certain 
period of time.18 
Although Mardinites commonly acknowledge the 1915 events as 
their shared experience, they refer to it by different names: Kurds and 
Arabs call it ferman (order [i.e. government decree]) while Syriac Chris-
tians refer to it as seyfo (sword). Syriac Christians see themselves as victims 
and view the Muslim communities (Kurds and Arabs) as the perpetrators 
of their suffering through their complicity with the Ottoman state.19 The 
Muslims of Mardin, particularly the Arabs, strenuously reject these allega-
tions, claiming that they were witnesses to the events and/or protectors 
of the Christians, not perpetrators. 
According to James Young, the act of naming frames knowledge 
of events and creates particular significations and interpretations about 
how to understand them.20 Clearly, ferman and seyfo signify the different 
dispositions of the different groups. Veena Das describes these kinds of 
signification as “internal language” through which the signs of injury are 
constructed, thereby occupying and inhabiting the world again and again. 
In her view, this reiteration does not necessarily happen through acts of 
“eternal forgetfulness” but rather through acts that have been absorbed 
into everyday life. The subjects of this ethnography have been formed 
through complex relations to the events which permeate everyday life 
and are internalized in such a way that they cannot be pushed “outside.” 
In other words, what is spoken becomes a kind of translation from an 
unknown language, and the narratives expressed through this language, 
whether silently or in acts of speech, simultaneously contain and dissolve 
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the antagonisms that are predicated on truth and condition the latter’s 
existence.21 
The following ethnographic examples are concerned with these forms 
of reiterations, showing how they occupy everyday life and affect the social 
interactions between various communities in Mardin. They illustrate how 
discourses and imagination surrounding the secrecy of the 1915 events 
are produced and mediated in the form of “public secrecy”—by families 
of both survivors and witnesses/perpetrators. In this context, it is useful 
to consider Michael Taussig’s formulation of the distinction between 
“secrecy” and “public secrecy.” Much inspired by Elias Canetti’s work, 
Crowds and Power, Taussig argues that a “secret” is an invention that 
exists within the “power of fantasy,” a “thing in itself,” imbued with a 
“Godlike” character and controlling people’s lives.22 He discusses secrecy 
as a site of power where social and political relationships are disguised in 
the form of fetish. Power operates through the fetishization of secrecy by 
people who construct it as a “hidden and momentous thing” and who 
imagine its exposition as being destructive and explosive.23 In his view, 
public secrecy derives from people’s complicity in disguising the power 
relationships behind the fetish. In Taussig’s words: “there is no such 
thing as a secret. It is an invention that comes out of the public secret, a 
limit-case, a supposition, a great ‘as if ’ without which the public secret 
would evaporate.” He regards “the public secret as fated to maintain the 
verge where the secret is not destroyed through exposure, but subject to 
a revelation that does justice to it.”24 Curious about the nature of this 
revelation, he asks: “Yet what if the truth is not so much a secret as a public 
secret?… Then what happens to the inspired act of defacement? Does it 
destroy the secret, or further empower it?”25
In his project on deconstructing secrecy, Taussig provocatively plays 
with the notion of defacement in order to make the reader think about 
the consequences of despoiling and tearing the object, which is the fetish, 
as an act of disfigurement: “defacement spoils the face as the figure of 
appearance, however as it does this, it may also animate the thing defaced, 
the mystery may become more mysterious.”26 Positing secrecy as the 
fetish, Taussig explains defacement as a figurative and metaphoric concept 
that characterizes the movement from “secrecy” to “public secrecy.” He 
describes this circular movement of public secrecy as a “reconfiguration 
of repression in which depth becomes surface so as to remain depth.”27 
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Stemming from this proposition, he extends the sphere of public secrecy, 
suggesting that it be considered not only as the limit-case of “what not to 
know” but also of “that which is generally known but cannot be spoken.”28 
In defining “public secrecy” this way, Taussig seeks to understand how 
secrecy as a fetish manifests itself in language. In other words, if public 
secrecy leads to a series of revelations that are followed by concealments, 
how are these revelations expressed through language? What becomes of 
the language of defacement? Incorporating Taussig’s concept of public 
secrecy into this ethnography, I explore how people speak of ferman and/
or seyfo as public secrecy without allowing it/them to be fully exposed. 
What are the images, tropes and idioms used to deface this secrecy?
 As an ethnographer, I never questioned anyone about the events 
of 1915. With my focus on the historical and political transformation of 
the city in the post-emergency process, I had been interviewing members 
of extended Kurdish families from Mardin in order to understand their 
changing position and influence on present-day city politics. In one of 
my first formal visits to the daughter of a well-known Kurdish agha (tribal 
leader), as we talked about her family’s history, Nazire provocatively asked 
me: “You are really interested in the Armenian issue, aren’t you?” I was 
discomfited by her question and doubted my intentions: Was that really 
the case? Was I, too, controlled by the secrecy of the events? I firmly 
responded that I had not asked any questions about that. Nazire did not 
seem convinced, but she did not pressure me. After our first encounter, we 
met two or three times a week to pursue the conversation. Each meeting 
began with her revealing a new topic that subsequently opened up spaces 
for an ongoing dialogue about her life. Talking about her family, Nazire 
explained to me:
There is an Armenian-ness rooted in the origin of every Kurd. In 
every house, there is an Armenian no one knows. There were so many 
mysterious women in the Akkas neighborhood. They would have 
recognized each other. Poor souls.… My uncle’s wife was Armenian. 
She was originally from Diyarbakir. Her name was Sofi, but it was 
changed to Ayşe after she became a Muslim. Her two daughters 
and her [first] husband were killed during ferman times. Her first 
husband’s name was Yusuf. Years later, she gave his name to one of 
her grandsons. When she was married to my uncle, she had a child 
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by him and was pregnant with a second one. Her mother-in-law did 
not want the newborn baby, so they gave the baby away to relatives 
in Syria. My uncle and Ayşe moved to Qamisli [in northeastern 
Syria] to escape from the blood feuds. Having arrived in Syria, Ayşe 
started to search for her daughter, and finally found her. But the child 
refused to see her. Years later, Ayşe’s [other] children by my uncle 
contacted the girl again. From time to time, they visit each another.
One day, Nazire took me to the house of Ayşe’s granddaughter, 
Sema, who lived close by in Mardin, so we could learn more about Ayşe/
Sofi. Nazire started by posing questions about Ayşe/Sofi with a mixture 
of curiosity and respect for her memory. At one point, Sema interrupted 
the conversation and left the room. She returned with a handcrafted piece 
that her grandmother Ayşe/Sofi had given to her as a wedding present. 
Nazire became emotional: “That is Syrian cloth— let me see how she 
expresses herself in the pattern.” I asked Sema if her grandmother had 
left her anything else, and Nazire asked: “What do you expect an exiled 
family to have?” Then Sema volunteered: “She had some gold. Yet, she 
sold it before she left for Qamisli. She also had a pillow and a bed, which 
she brought with her to my grandfather’s house. She took them with her 
everywhere.” 
Sema remembered Sunday mornings when Ayşe/Sofi silently left the 
house to go to church with her Syriac Christian neighbors. “Everyone 
knew about it, but nobody ever said anything. Her son, my uncle, was so 
attached to her. Sometimes he would ask her to go on pilgrimage with 
him to Mecca. Then my grandmother would ask him to take her to Jeru-
salem.” According to Sema, before Ayşe/Sofi died, in her last moments 
she wanted to convert to Islam. She took the Muslim oath and asked the 
family to read the Koran to her. She was buried in the family cemetery. But 
her family never forgot her past, always remembering her as the woman 
of Armenian origin named Sofi. Ayşe and Sofi existed together as con-
verted identities. The secrecy was embedded in the transformation of Sofi 
into Ayşe, yet Ayşe was unmasked and turned back into Sofi through the 
revelation of public secrets in the fragmented narratives of her relatives, 
Nazire and Sema.
In Mardin the acts of such unmasking are captured in sequences 
of images and concepts. Referring to Canetti’s discussion of secrecy in 
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his Crowds and Power, Taussig notes that “The outstanding thing about 
exposure is its speediness (‘like lightning,’ says Canetti).… [It leads] 
from invisibility into explosive force….”29 In Mardin, the secrecy was also 
revealed “like lightning.” Should a passerby who had converted be rec-
ognized, that person would be exposed. Hence, the image of the man in 
the shop, of the butcher or of the woman living down the street could all 
bring secrets to light in a flash. Looking down at the people in the market 
square from the balcony of her house, a middle-aged woman from a local 
Arab family explained:
This woman’s grandmother was also Armenian. They were two sisters 
and one brother. They lost their brother. Mehmet Agha married 
one of the sisters, the widowed one, and took her daughter and her 
younger sister under his protection. The sister never got married. 
She was always hostile toward Muslims. One day, my mother visited 
them to celebrate their bayram (Christmas). That day, she told my 
mother everything and showed her a photo of their brother, who 
was taken away and never returned. Although Mehmet Agha’s wife’s 
daughter married a Muslim man, she remained Christian and was 
allowed to go to church every Sunday.
Despite their common reference to kinship discourse, in Mardin Kurds and 
Arabs continue to position themselves differently vis-à-vis their memories 
of the events of 1915. As Michel de Certeau says, “secrecy forms a play 
between actors. It circumscribes the terrain of strategic relations between 
the one who is supposed to know and the one who is supposed not to 
know.”30 In Mardin, older Arab inhabitants are more reluctant than Kurds 
to speak about those events. They significantly distance themselves from the 
Kurds, regarding themselves as witnesses and protectors, while condemn-
ing the Kurds for being perpetrators. In the words of an old Arab man, 
this is because of the essential character of the Kurds, who are “ignorant 
and subversive” when dealing with authority. According to him, the real 
natives of Mardin—the Arabs and Syriac Christians—never subverted or 
challenged the Turkish state’s sovereignty. It was always the Kurds who 
created problems.
Tension between Kurds and Arabs is rooted in historical conflicts and 
negotiations between nomadic tribes and landowning families. This led 
to spatial segregation and discrimination between the urban and the rural 
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(in Kurdish, bajari and gundi, respectively), the former being associated 
with the Arab and Christian populations and the latter with the Kurds. 
Under Ottoman rule, the Arab landlords predominantly consolidated 
their power in Mardin by collecting taxes and subsidizing the local army, 
which was the local representative of Ottoman authority, and by fighting 
against the Kurdish tribes that frequently attacked the city.31 Following 
the establishment of the Turkish Republic, old Arab families regained their 
positions in the bureaucratic system and were entrusted with promoting 
and implementing the reforms of the new regime as well as surveying their 
efficacy in the public and private spheres.32 
Like other cities in Turkey, Mardin received its first influx of migrants, 
mainly Kurds and Mahallamis from the villages and nearby towns, in the 
1950s.33 Despite discrimination by local Arabs, the newcomers managed to 
adapt to the conditions of life in the city. The emigration of the large Arab 
families started in the 1960s and accelerated in the 1970s due to economic 
reasons that were related to their loss of economic and political power in 
the city. With the intensification of the conflict between the PKK and the 
Turkish armed forces, everyday life worsened for Syriac Christians and 
Arabs. Seeking to avoid getting caught in the crossfire, Syriac Christians 
precipitously left Mardin. At the same time, displaced Kurdish villagers 
filled the vacuum left in the city. As they arrived, Kurdish families began 
to create fortified neighborhoods on the outskirts of the city and next to 
the city’s old cemeteries. Meanwhile, Arabs and Syriac Christians mapped 
these areas as sites of poverty, terror and violence. In the social imaginary 
of elderly inhabitants, these areas were reminders of the absence and loss 
of the city’s imagined qualities.
My research revealed Kurds to be more open than Arabs in express-
ing their involvement in the events of 1915. Within the political discourse 
of the pro-Kurdish party (BDP) and the PKK, ferman was referred to as 
historical evidence of the atrocities of the Turkish state toward its minori-
ties. While they acknowledge their responsibility in the events of 1915, 
they claim that both Kurds and Armenians were victims of state genocide 
and it is a priori important to acknowledge the other’s suffering and 
support their political struggle. Apart from this political discourse, there 
were other discursive spaces in which ferman was extensively referred to. 
Often children and grandchildren, without expressing acknowledgment or 
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denial of the events of 1915 as “genocide,” would—through their family 
histories—reveal elder family members as perpetrators. 
I witnessed a complex example of this kind of revelation during a 
meeting with a ninety-seven-year-old Kurdish man that was arranged for 
me by one of his grandsons. Ali wanted me to record his grandfather’s 
life history. The old man’s name was Osman Bey. Ali drove me to a vil-
lage where we were greeted by a crowd of Osman Bey’s children and 
grandchildren, some of whom had come for the day just to listen to the 
interview. After greeting the entire family, finally we moved into Osman 
Bey’s room. His eldest son introduced me to him in Kurdish and the 
interview started with me asking questions about his family’s history in 
the village. Osman Bey responded with long convoluted answers about 
the blood feuds the family was caught up in, about their involvement in 
the war for independence and their resistance to the new Turkish state, 
followed by their sudden, inevitable flight to Syria. In the middle of the 
interview, the eldest son mumbled incomprehensibly, whispering to his 
sisters and nephews and then he raised his voice, saying directly, “Dad, 
tell her what happened during the ferman times.” Osman Bey ignored his 
son and continued with the story of his escape to Syria. His son insisted, 
reminding Osman Bey that he had omitted speaking about the ferman 
era. At this second interruption, Osman Bey lowered his voice, cast a 
meaningful glance at his son and unintelligibly uttered several names.
Soon thereafter, the meeting degenerated into an argument between 
Osman Bey and his children, with me in the middle. They were trying 
to force their father to break his silence while, at the same time, urging 
me to make him speak. I withdrew uncomfortably from the discussion 
while Osman Bey’s eldest son took over conducting the interview, ask-
ing his father over and over again in both Turkish and Kurdish, “Dad, 
Dad, do you remember? Tell us what happened to the children of the 
Christians during ferman.” Osman Bey refused to break his silence. He 
stared vacantly, turned his back to us, and went to sleep. After we left the 
room, his children carried on the narrative by relating fragments of Osman 
Bey’s untold story—incidents in which he had been both “murderer” and 
“abductor.” As if emphasizing the point he was making, the eldest son 
said to me: “My mother was Armenian.”
I stayed in the village for three days, mostly spending time with the 
young women of the house while I waited for Osman Bey to feel ready 
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to continue the interview. His children’s attempt to force him to reveal 
his personal involvement in it had created an unpleasant feeling, and after 
that occasion, his children neither joined in our conversations nor made 
any other comments about their father’s involvement in ferman. Why 
had Osman Bey’s children tried to force him to reveal the loathsome 
secret parts of his life in front of a stranger? Why had they wanted those 
revelations to be part of the family’s recorded history? Was it the burden 
of the events of 1915 that made them try to force their father to reveal 
his actions? Finally, when his children were no longer present, Osman 
Bey went on with his life story, presenting himself as an influential tribal 
leader. He made no reference to ferman.
Nevzat was a young Kurdish man from a town near Mardin. His 
knowledge of the massacres was based on stories about two Armenian 
women in his family who had been abducted and—after they had con-
verted to Islam—had been married to his great-uncles. The first time I 
visited him at his place of business, he was engaged in a discussion with 
two Syriac Christian men about a project to repair the ruined houses in the 
abandoned Christian villages. Most of his customers were Syriac Christians 
he had befriended—from Mardin, nearby towns and villages and from 
abroad. Not only was this kind of acquaintance exceptional and risky, it 
also occasioned many rumors accusing him of hunting for treasure in the 
ruins of Christian houses and villages. But this did not trouble him. In 
his view, this attitude was typical of people in a “mixed” (karışık) place.
In fact, Nevzat’s office was one of the few spaces in town where one 
could witness unexpected and unique social encounters. There Nevzat 
initiated conversations in which he asked his Syriac Christian friends to 
draw comparisons between Islam and Christianity. He himself was not 
a religious person, he said, but he was curious to understand the effects 
of religion on culture. His Syriac Christian friends did not hesitate to 
respond with long, repetitious explanations about the unifying, humanistic 
and peaceful effects of Christianity on Syriac Christian culture, while at 
the same time condemning Islam for its violent ideology and destructive 
effects. Their narratives were filled with images of atrocities and incidents 
of humiliation and exclusion at the hands of Muslims, particularly Kurds. 
Although the explanations were highly detailed, the narratives were often 
anonymous—without any mention of names, places or dates. They were 
token stories that affirmed the fixed historical view of the Kurds as perpe-
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trators and the Syriac Christians as victims. Nevzat patiently responded to 
his guests, with only silent, affirmative gestures. In his words: 
My Syriac Christian and Armenian friends express their anger and 
hatred for Kurds all the time although they know that I, too, am a 
Kurd. I am so tired of being held responsible for everything they went 
through, but I also feel that I must listen to what they say, even if it 
is the same old story. This is the burden of ferman on my shoulders. 
This is the shadow of the past on my present. I cannot escape that.
Nevzat’s position was unusual. He had created a social space in which 
he allowed for the revelation of his Syriac Christian friends’ bitter stories, 
while at the same time he disavowed expression of his own predicament. 
This does not mean that Nevzat transgressed the rule of maintaining the 
public secrecy. He once pointed out to me that I, as an anthropologist, 
only have the right to write about his reflections on ferman, not about 
his narrative of the actual events. He said that one day he himself would 
write a book about ferman, narrating the stories he had heard from his two 
Armenian female relatives. Even if he did not find the courage to write a 
book, he would try to make a film based on those real stories. In his view, 
“this is the only way to get rid of the burden of this event.” 
INVISIBLE VICTIMS
According to Syriac Christians, even though their suffering equaled that 
of the Armenians, they are the invisible victims of the seyfo of 1915. In 
some instances they had survived either because of last-minute inter-
ventions by local governors or by escaping to Syria. Later, the majority 
of the Syriac Christian population returned to the city. However, their 
churches and houses were appropriated by the state along with property 
belonging to Italian and American missionaries. While the buildings of 
the Syriac Catholic Patriarchate were turned into gendarme stations in 
the first years of the Turkish Republic, the Italian mission buildings were 
gradually demolished, first because of road works initiated by the Ger-
mans in 1915, then during a second wave of construction in 1923. The 
monastery was flattened in 1930 and the empty lot was used for a public 
Zerrin Özlem Biner
82 History & Memory, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Fall/Winter 2010)
park before being turned into the Square of the Republic with a massive 
statue of Atatürk in the 1960s (figure 1). 
Syriac Christians started to leave Mardin in the 1940s following 
enactment of a law (20 Kura Yasasi) ordering the recruitment of Christian 
citizens into the army. With the memory of the events of 1915 still vivid in 
their minds, most of the Syriac Christians escaped to Qamisli, Syria, which 
was already a place of exile for Syriac Christian and Armenian survivors 
of 1915, as well as for protagonists of Kurdish uprisings and blood feuds. 
Syriac Christian migration increased in 1974 due to the harassment they 
suffered locally during the Cyprus War. The acceleration of the conflict 
between the PKK and the Turkish armed forces in the 1980s led to the 
last wave of Syriac Christian emigration. 
Fig. 1. Statue of Atatürk, founder of the Republic of Turkey, in the 
Square of the Republic, Mardin. The square was built on the site of a 
former Syriac Christian monastery. The wreaths had been placed by local 
political parties and official institutions during the 2001 commemoration 
of Turkey’s independence. Photo by author.
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While Armenians were referred to as victims of the 1915 events, 
and thus sought recognition as victims of “genocide,” at the official level 
the Syriac Christians who had remained in Turkey withdrew from this 
contested ground, choosing to remain silent in order to continue to live 
under the sovereignty of the Turkish state.34 Despite their apparent sub-
mission to the official discourse, in Mardin they claim to know the truth 
of the critical events precisely because of their experience of the violence, 
both as victims and as witnesses/survivors. Marie Theresa Hernández 
describes such a state of being as “delirio,” which results “when reality 
cannot be placed in a coherent location; when repeated moments in his-
tory are situated in hidden or inaccessible places.”35 In Mardin, “delirio” 
can be detected in the eyes of Christians who are overcome by anxiety 
and fear. The knowledge they try to locate is embedded in their narratives 
about houses and converts. Here, “conversion” refers to being concealed 
as a Muslim, being camouflaged and forced to mimic the other. After the 
violence of 1915, some Syriac Christians remained Muslim while others 
re-converted to Christianity years after the “Kurds were sent into exile,” 
the “Kurdish leader of the tribe died” or “after they escaped from the 
village to Syria.” The memory of the 1915 events became a community 
secret, thereby assuring their survival, while at the same time it produced 
a contingent imaginary in which every Muslim subject was regarded as 
possibly being a convert of Syriac Christian origin. In this respect, the 
hidden past belonged not only to the Christian community but also to 
their Muslim neighbors.
In addition to converts, houses also trigger fear and curiosity relating 
to the memory of seyfo. In Mardin, Christian dwellings and cemeteries in 
particular have been regarded as spaces to be excavated in quest of the 
unknown, the “hidden treasures” that once belonged to the Christian 
families.36 It is strongly believed that the Christians had buried their valu-
ables (mainly gold coins and jewelry) before they left the city during the 
ferman times. Since this idea first seized people’s imagination, the eager 
search for hidden treasure has driven people to dig up their own or empty 
houses and cemeteries. Basements are the first places to be excavated, but 
the defilement does not stop there. Sooner or later the quest for hidden 
treasure leads people to suspect that the thick stone walls of the houses 
hold secret items and therefore to undertake many small-scale excavations. 
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Nothing is found, but holes in walls, basements and courtyards are the 
marks of their obsessive search for remnants of the hidden past.
In Mardin, particularly for Arab families, stone mansions represent 
honor, prestige and power, embodying the families’ social and economic 
capital, while, for Syriac Christians, the houses are appropriated proof of 
their original—and amputated—urban roots. In their fragmented nar-
ratives, the Syriac Christians express their sense of belonging to Mardin 
by describing what had once been in the place that is now empty and by 
identifying the houses they had once occupied. 
While walking to a recently vacated house with two Syriac Christian 
friends, Daniel and Mihail, I mentally entered into their recollections 
of the city as they described the history of old stone mansions that had 
belonged to Syriac Christian families. Daniel vividly recalled stories that he 
had been told about the dwellings in Mardin. His interest in the history 
of the Syriac Christians and his commitment to church activities made 
him a popular young person in the Syriac Christian community. He had 
spent most of his life in Mardin and, like all Syriac Christian children, he 
had been brought up hearing about the horrors of seyfo and stories of 
abducted women and children. He and his peers were taught to show 
strict obedience to the state, the church and the community. In his view, 
Syriac Christians are submissive because, as ancient and true Christians, 
they still adhere to the ancient injunction to “turn the other cheek when 
struck.”37 However, notwithstanding his strong belief in Christianity, he 
was convinced that young Syriac Christians should make every possible 
effort to regain what was taken from their forebears. He was conscious 
that many people of his parents’ generation and his own had fled Mardin 
because of their painful memories of seyfo and because of fears of abuse 
and humiliation. Most of his friends and relatives were living in the dias-
pora where they suffered from having lost their “culture” and from the 
sense of existing in permanent limbo. For him, the only way to remain an 
authentic Syriac Christian was to continue living in Mardin.
As we walked, Daniel pointed out the elementary school building as 
well as two stone mansions, both of which had belonged to Syriac Chris-
tian families. There were many stories about Syriac Christian homes and 
churches that were haunted by ghosts. One church in the northern part of 
the city had been converted into a mosque at the beginning of the 1920s 
and for a while was used as it was. Later, to differentiate it from the nearby 
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church and identify its new use, one of the Muslim family foundations 
decided to add a minaret to the building. This was never completed, how-
ever, because the minaret kept collapsing during construction. For Daniel, 
this was proof that the church itself resisted being converted. The minaret 
was only finished in 2003. Even then, the mosque did not find peace: 
according to local rumor, since the minaret was finished, a mysterious beam 
of light has illuminated it every night. Finally, after a long walk through 
the valley, we came to the mansion that Daniel and Mihail wanted me to 
see. It had been built by two Armenian families whose leaders had been 
exiled and killed during the events of 1915. Subsequently, their widows 
had sold the mansion to two families: an Arab family and a prominent 
Syriac Christian family. Later, the Syriac Christian family had bought the 
whole house and lived in it until the 1960s. After that, Muslim families 
had occupied parts of it until finally, after a long dispute, it was vacated. 
Taking out a key and opening the huge chain lock on the door, 
Daniel added jokingly: “My great aunt says the occupiers of the house 
are terrorists.” Mihail ran ahead of us into the courtyard to see if anyone 
was in the house. Peering through the windows, he checked to see if the 
neighbors were illegally siphoning off electricity or water from the house. 
“It’s impossible to stop these occupiers. Even if they vacate the house, 
they continue to use water and electricity.” 
We passed from the courtyard into the big common room. Daniel 
went upstairs to check other parts of the mansion while Mihail and I 
identified details we were familiar with from other houses. Daniel rejoined 
us, filling the empty room with his historical imaginary of a Syriac Chris-
tian home, interpreting illegible—and invisible—details including the 
decorative carvings around the windows, the size and color of the doors, 
the shape of the door knockers and door handles, the special patterns 
on the ceiling in the main room and the hidden doors and passages that 
connected the rooms. Daniel explained that this spatial arrangement and 
interior decoration are signs of particular tastes, habits and customs that 
require knowledge of a particular lifestyle that is unknown to gundis (vil-
lagers). According to him, these dwellings indicate an urban culture that 
had been created in Mardin by its Syriac Christians and had vanished with 
their forced flight and emigration. 
Although the Muslim (mainly Arab) elites of the city find the Syriac 
Christians’ cynical remarks troubling, they prefer to remain silent about 
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the histories of their houses and their possible connections to the Syriac 
Christian or Armenian families who had once lived there. From the per-
spective of some Arab elites, the Syriac Christians have been fabricating 
“facts” in order to make claims on the city’s cultural heritage. The attitudes 
of other local inhabitants, in particular those of the Kurdish families, differ 
from Arab families regarding appropriated houses and churches. In gen-
eral, they remain indifferent, both to cynical remarks by Syriac Christians 
and to outsiders’ curiosity. On some occasions, they welcome anonymous 
visitors who want to visit the house. When asked about a house’s history, 
they occasionally acknowledge having known the original owners, but 
more often they merely point out the distinctive Christian aspects of the 
house, such as icons, tunnels and basements.
A Kurdish family who had settled in an old Armenian church seemed 
to have gotten used to visitors. Passing through the hallway to the garden, 
the children of the family would first take visitors to the cemetery and point 
out the inscriptions about the priests buried in its walls. Then, under the 
gaze of family members, visitors would walk through the rooms of the old 
church that had been transformed into the rooms of a family home. Dur-
ing these visits, a male member of the family would point out the broken 
icons or distorted images on the walls and ceiling of the old church. When 
there were female visitors, occasionally young or middle-aged women of 
the family would accompany the tour and share their gendered knowl-
edge of the interior of the house. Leaving the young men and children 
behind, the women would lead the female visitors to the intimate corners 
of the house and point out residual features of the church—niches with 
pigeon- or grape-shaped sculptures, crosses, candleholders and murals 
hidden by carpets, piles of pillows, blankets, family photos and kitchen 
towels belonging to the present occupants (figure 2).
The Armenian families in Mardin do not describe their fate as having 
been any different from that of the Syriac Christians: they made comments 
similar to those of the Syriac Christians about the abduction of women and 
the confiscation of their property. However, the Armenian families who 
had left Mardin in the 1950s and settled in Istanbul are extremely critical, 
not only of the local Muslims of Mardin, but also of the Syriac Christians 
whom they regard as having been silent collaborators. This is due to the fact 
that unlike Armenians, Syriac Christians had not been forced to leave the 
city. Moreover, like the Muslims, they had used the opportunity to adopt 
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Armenian children, incorporating them into their families by re-baptizing 
them and assimilating them into their community. In addition, many of 
the monuments, churches and stone mansions that have been reclaimed 
by Syriac Christians had originally belonged to Armenians. The latter 
consider that the Syriac Christians benefited from official condemnation 
and disavowal of the Armenians’ cultural and historical presence in order 
to take over that heritage and become the only “authentic” Christian 
community within contemporary, cosmopolitan Mardin. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Through the ethnographic material presented here, I have attempted to 
show how memories of the events of 1915 have moved from secrecy to 
public secrecy, and how acts of defacement are enacted through narratives 
about the converted (dönme) Christians and their abandoned property. As 
both victims and perpetrators of the events, the inhabitants of Mardin have 
never allowed their secrets to be fully exposed. They have maintained them 
as public secrecy, which functions as a mobile and perpetually renewing 
Fig. 2. The interior decoration of a living room in a Kurdish home that once belonged to a 
Syriac Christian family. Photo by author.
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interface between the various groups in Mardin. In that respect, public 
secrecy in Mardin is not only the standard for what should not be known 
but also for what should not be discussed. In presenting the phenomenon 
of public secrecy in Mardin, I show the language of defacement through 
the narratives of kinship, conversion and appropriation that blend the 
known with the unknown, producing rumor and ambiguity along with 
the storytelling. As Taussig notes, being the conveyor and mediator of 
public secrecy, “a person is compromised in a complicated emotional  and 
epistemological manner into the system….”38 
Throughout my interviews, the Syriac Christians continually 
unmasked objects and subjects of secrecy. However, despite their resent-
ment and anger, they have acquiesced to the fetishization of secrecy and 
the production of public secrecy because of their fear of renewed abuse 
and violence on the part of the Muslim communities (which could once 
again be endorsed by the state). Kurdish and Arab complicity results from 
different personal and collective histories, finding their own modes of 
defacement through kinship tropes which serve to reveal the presence of 
Christian family members who had converted to Islam, and of appropri-
ated Christian property. The Arabs view themselves merely as witnesses, 
while the Kurds recite personal and collective histories of violent acts their 
ancestors had committed and also engage in political discourse that con-
demns the Turkish state for its atrocities against both the Kurds and the 
Armenians. Kurdish narratives conceal another order of secrecy, which is 
the complicity of Muslim families and the Turkish state in the violence of 
the “inclusive exclusion” of the Christian families and properties. 
This article has attempted to carve out ways of tackling the Armenian 
crisis that stands at the center of the past and the present of contemporary 
Turkey. With these ethical concerns in mind, I have considered the multiple 
representations of a “critical event” in relation to the transformation of an 
official taboo. What is most important in the midst of this tangle of inter-
pretations, metaphors and metaphysical assumptions is to become aware 
of our own projections onto texts and realities. Self-critical interpretation 
should take into account all possible conditions of agency and all kinds 
of reference. Nevertheless, the main and final concern of my article is to 
facilitate the kind of interpretation that allows for a plurality of meanings 
and opens a space to evaluate these meanings. With awareness of the ways 
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in which knowledge is produced, can we use our methods and techniques 
to break with the collective suffering and pain? 
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